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Abstract
Enactivists frequently argue their account heralds a revolution in cognitive science: enactivism will
unseat cognitivism as the dominant paradigm. We examine the lines of reasoning enactivists employ in
stirring revolt, but show that none of these prove compelling reasons for cognitivism to be replaced by
enactivism. First, we examine the hard sell of enactivism: enactivism reveals a critical explanatory gap at
the heart of cognitivism. Drawing on Steiner (2019), we show that enactivism does not meet the
requirements to incite a paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense - there is no internal crisis in cognitivism.
Nor does it provide inherently better explanations of cognition as some have claimed. Second, we
consider the soft sell of enactivism: enactivism provides a more attractive, parsimonious, or clear-eyed
lens on cognition. This move proves to boil down to a misunderstanding of how theories are selected in
science. Instead we lend support to a broader and more desirable way to conceive of enactivism -
Gallagher’s (2017) proposal that enactivism is a philosophy of nature. We explain how a philosophy of
nature does more than support a single research paradigm by integrating scienti c questions into a
cohesive picture.
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“The big problem I have about enactivism is figuring out what it is.”
- Ned Block
1. Introduction
Contemporary cognitive science seeks to  nd and explain the internal mechanisms that, in a similar
fashion to human-designed computers, represent and process our sensory inputs, thought processes, and
produce our motor outputs. The theory of enactivism, developed from the work of Maturana and Varela
(1980), eschews this computational analogy of the mind and instead looks to build a theory of cognition tied to
fundamental organizational biological processes. Now a fairly cohesive research programme after further
development by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991), enactivism posits a fundamental linkage between
biological organization and cognitive processes. The research program of enactivism, drawing also from the
embodied, action-oriented phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (2012), takes cognitive processes to be necessarily
world-involving, as the organism’s morphology, history, and the biological conditions of its persistence establish
what the organism is able and aiming to do. In proposing these sweeping changes to how we understand the
connection between living and cognition, the enactivist literature is often suggestive of a worldview, of
overarching commitments and principles that di er greatly from those held by classical cognitivist science.
Contemporary enactivism “emphasize[s] the role of the dynamical coupling of brain–
body–environment” (Di Paolo 2018 p. 3). Enactivists “view the organism as a self-organizing, autonomous,
autopoietic system” (Chemero 2009 p. 152) and they “insist that biological aspects of bodily life, including
organismic and emotion regulation of the entire body, have a permeating e ect on cognition, as do processes of
sensorimotor coupling between organism and environment” (Gallagher 2017 p. 7). So described, enactivists
make a statement of intent for a new approach to studying cognition. Statements of intent, though, are
potentially vague about the speci cs of what enactivism means beyond a certain angle on cognition. This picture
is many things to many people: a heterodox alternative to traditional cognitive science, a remonstration of
analytic philosophy of mind with the phenomenological tradition, an overarching story that explains the
continuity of life and mind. What might jump out from this characterisation is both its breadth, and its
indeterminacy. Is enactivism the synthesis of divergent perspectives on the mind, an empirical program, the
natural successor to cognitivism, all of the above, or something else?
The received view amongst enactivists seems to be that enactivism is primarily an alternate research
paradigm for cognitive science. The stronger iteration of this view is that enactivism is not merely an explanatory
alternative to cognitivism, but provides superior explanations when compared to its rival and thereby supersedes
it (Hutto and Myin 2013, 2017; Di Paolo et al 2017). A weaker iteration is that enactivism merely o ers a more
desirable explanatory alternative to cognitivism, where the goal is to eschew representations (Hutto and Myin
2013, 2017; Barandiaran 2017). We will argue that neither of these approaches heralds the coming enactive
revolution, and that the critiques present in these approaches do little harm to cognitivism. However, we are not
arguing, as many already have, that enactivism therefore ought to integrate itself with its rivals, give up its
commitments (or smooth them over as mere expository or semantic disagreements) and come in from the cold
back to mainstream cognitive science (Miłkowski et al. 2018).
Rather than backing the weaker reading of enactivism as an alternative research paradigm, we o er
support for a more visionary alternative. Drawing on discussions by Godfrey-Smith (2001, 2014), and Gallagher
(2017), we propose that a better way to think of enactivism is as a philosophy of nature. As a philosophy of
nature, the breadth of concerns taken up in the enactivist literature address more than a single research
paradigm. The proposals of enactivism aim not at replacing cognitivism as a research paradigm, but its
underpinning (and more broadly pervasive) commitments.
In the following section, we will examine claims that enactivism is a research paradigm that will displace
cognitivism through superior explanatory power, what we call the hard sell of enactivism. Following Steiner
(2019), we will argue that there is no such impending paradigm shift. We evaluate competing views on social
cognition as an example of the explanatory adequacy of both cognitivists and enactivists,  nding that the
literature at this point provides no reason to favour one explanation over the other except for one’s own
pre-existing commitment to either camp. In section 3 we evaluate the soft sell of enactivism, which pitches
enactivism as a more intuitively appropriate way to understand cognition compared to cognitivism. We similarly
 nd this approach to be unsuccessful, since its success hinges on one already holding enactive commitments. In
section 4 we turn to discuss an alternative aim for enactivism: to serve as a philosophy of nature rather than a
proposal for a scienti c paradigm, an undertaking which we see as more achievable, more genuinely
revolutionary and more aligned with the existing enactivist project.
2. Is The Sky Falling?
Talk of representation wars and cognitive revolutions is ubiquitous in the philosophy of cognitive
science literature. The claim that contemporary enactivism views itself as a rival paradigm to cognitivism is fairly
trivial, as it is mentioned pervasively in the literature: “There is a small but growing community of researchers
spanning a spectrum of academic disciplines which are united in rejecting the still dominant computationalist
framework in favor of the late biologist’s Francisco Varela’s paradigm of enaction” (Froese and Di Paolo 2011) p.
1, emphasis added). Contemporary enactivists have warned us that “[r]evolution is, yet again, in the air” (Hutto
and Myin 2013 p. 1), that we are “in the midst of a major scienti c revolution, properly described as a paradigm
shift” (Gibbs 2011, p. 82), and that “[t]he revolutionary narrative that has always accompanied enactivism is
now warming up” (Barandiaran 2017 p. 409). The “revolutionary ambitions” (Steiner 2019, p. 4) of enactivism
seem to rest on the idea that cognitive science has an impending paradigm shift on the horizon, one that will  nd
enactivism replacing cognitivism as the dominant paradigm. This kind of talk has been buoyed by those
criticising enactivism or its more radical tenets. For example, Michael Wheeler, in detailing what would be
needed for 4E to have a “truly paradigm-shifting result” (2015, p. 2), has gone so far as to draw a comparison
between the theses proposed by enactivists and the ‘April Theses’ delivered by Lenin at meetings of the
All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies in 1917.
What is it about the enactive framework, though, that makes this talk of revolutions and
paradigm-shifts appropriate? Should we understand enactivism as a rival paradigm to cognitivism? On Kuhn’s
well-known account (1962), scienti c paradigms are understood as being the set of commitments shared within
scienti c communities, and on which they can rely as received assumptions in scienti c practice. In other words,
a paradigm refers to the shared commitments that enable the practice of a particular research program. Kuhn
deems the general consensus about these shared commitments amongst scientists in a particular  eld ‘normal
science’. This is when things are moving along more or less unproblematically, and where the practice of science
under this paradigm is able to forge ahead (generate research) without running into any major holes or
explanatory issues. Computational cognitive science is one such research paradigm: it has been the dominant
explanatory framework for decades, it overthrew behaviourism as its paradigmatic predecessor, and it has been
profoundly useful for conducting empirical research and designing testing procedures.
The appropriateness of the term “paradigm shift” to describe the endgame of enactivism has been
challenged recently by Pierre Steiner (2019). Steiner points out that a paradigm shift results from the persistent
failures of the existing paradigm to produce solutions to problems generated from within the paradigm (Kuhn
1970). This leads to a crisis, followed by a scienti c revolution when a succeeding paradigm is adopted: “A
scienti c revolution, for Kuhn, is radical: it does not consist in a change of observations, results and theories; it is
a conceptual change in virtue of which the meaning of terms is drastically changed, but also a foundational
change. New principles, laws and de nitions are introduced” (Steiner 2019, p. 7). Enactivists are certainly aware
of the drastic and concrete changes needed to set up such an alternative: enactivism “would be of limited interest
if it were only a collection of speculative arguments'' (Di Paolo et al 2017 p. 21). Much recent work has been
aimed to formulate conceptual posits “in terms that allow for them to be tested, improved, and, if necessary,
rejected by scienti c standards'' (Di Paolo et al 2017 pg. 21). Having set themselves up as a non-representational1
or anti-cognitivist framework, a counterpoint to the mainstream, enactivists have set their sights on producing a
working empirical research program (i.e. Buhrmann et al 2013; Buhrmann and Di Paolo 2014; Rucinska and
Reijmers 2014; De Jaegher et al 2017; Valenzuela-Moguillansky et al 2021).
1 Not all enactivists are anti-representational. Hutto and Myin (2017, see also (Myin and van den Herik 2020)) have
recently argued that certain linguistic capacities to involve “representations'' - though in both accounts it is unclear how the
act of representing through language implies the necessity of representational cognitive processes. Such accounts are overly
promiscuous in what counts as a cognitive process - we  nd this to be an unnecessary concession in con ict with core
enactivist commitments.
Assembling a research paradigm is one thing, and bringing about a paradigm shift is another. In order
to judge that a paradigm shift is nigh, computationalism must be on the verge of abandonment due to its
inability to solve problems regarded as acute from within the paradigm itself (Steiner 2019; Kuhn 1962/2012).
However, contemporary cognitive science su ers no inability to continue articulating new problems and
investigating their solutions. The classical cognitivist paradigm is not debilitated by its reliance on computation
and representations in a way that would generate wide-spread insecurity (Steiner 2019, p. 8). Moreover despite
the tendency to frame the con ict between the enactive and cognitivist camps in terms of paradigms, enactivists
also tend to be forthright about what they’re up against in this regard: “[cognitivism] is a successful formula for
the practice of research, a powerful recipe for generating empirical hypotheses and testing them, accumulating
results, and assembling theoretical frameworks. It is the way things are currently done in the sciences of the
mind, the way they have been done for over six decades” (Di Paolo et al 2017 pg. 2).
Given the absence of a looming crisis within cognitivism itself, an extra step has, it seems, had to be
added to the enactive battle plan. First, enactivists have tried to o er a compelling case to cognitivists that there
already exists an intractable problem within the cognitivist paradigm that will eventually lead to its downfall, a
ticking time bomb waiting to go o  inside cognitivism. That is, enactivists have the additional challenge of
stoking awareness of perceived de ciencies, those that will at some point turn into intractable problems within
the cognitivist paradigm itself, and which enactivism is better equipped to handle. This is what we call the hard
sell of enactivism.
The most prevalent way enactivists have sought to convince cognitive science of this impending
breakdown is by proposing an oversight in the cognitivist framework, the existence of some sort of unbridgeable
explanatory gap. For example, Thompson (2007) points to an explanatory gap between cognitive processes and
consciousness in cognitivism,popularized as “the hard problem of consciousness” in Chalmers (1996),
proposing that “the enactive approach o ers important resources for making progress on [this] explanatory gap”
(p. 14). However, this turns out to be a bit of a false start: he also concedes that some cognitivists (Pylyshyn
1984) have dismissed this problem as not “within the province of cognitive science” (Thompson 2007, p. 6). In
order for this to be a problem that poses the sort of threat to cognitivism that would lead to a paradigm shift,
one  rst has to accept that this largely philosophical problem translates to a tractable empirical problem that
cognitive science wants to solve - that is, to place the gap in cognitivism as seen by cognitivists themselves.
Similarly, we  nd an explanatory gap alluded to in Di Paolo et al (2018), but here the target is
functionalism as a cognitivist explanatory methodology. They argue that while cognitivists have embraced
embodiment as an explanatorily relevant factor in studying cognition, this embrace has simply amounted to “a
larger causal structure for building functionalist explanations” (p. 19). That is, cognitivist assimilations of
embodiment still leave out the interactive nature of the agent-environment relationship. Di Paolo et al. argue
that “enactive ideas also permit theorizing about concrete bodies, bodies that live and labor, su ering bodies,
subject to disease, pains, and joys, and that must attend to needs for food, shelter, sex, relating to others, and so
on” (ibid). However, functional explanations provided in cognitivist theories of niche construction, cognitive
o oading, and social cognition can be considered interactive, though perhaps transactional rather than
recursive, as enactivists tend to conceive of these processes. A functionalist already has to  nd this
characterization lacking in order to need an alternative. It is also not clear in what way functional explanations
fail to permit theories of our basic bodily needs--this is precisely the methodology of basal cognition research, for
instance (Lyon et al. 2021). And again, one must be convinced not only that cognitivism is incapable of
providing theories for these issues, but also that these issues are within the purview of cognitive science to begin
with.
It does not seem as though any major explanatory gaps are threatening cognitivism. From within
cognitivism, enactivism poses no major threat by adding explananda in need of explanantia that simply do not
exist within the cognitivist framework. This is a misguided criticism, akin to claiming a car doesn’t work
properly because it doesn’t  y - such an observation does not reveal cognitivism to be a lemon. To demonstrate
that both cognitivist and enactivist theories are capable of providing explanations for phenomena that meet the
criteria as de ned from within their own research programs, we will look at the well-known example of social
cognition.
2.1. Social Cognition: Having it Both Ways
Both enactivism and traditional cognitive science have a deep interest in how it is that people are able to
understand and predict the behaviour of others. Here we take a typical example of how cognitivist and enactive
explanations are pitted against one another using competing explanations of social cognition. The mainstream
cognitivist account - sometimes called the “mindreading” account - holds that social cognition consists in the
ability of people to infer and attribute “beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions” (Spaulding 2018 p. 1) to
others in order to make sense of and predict their behaviour. The speci c means by which people are able to
make these attributions is generally thought to involve either theorising about or simulating the contents of
another agent’s mind, and thereby inferring their reasons for acting. These two proposals are known respectively
as theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). While they di er on the details of how mindreading gets
done, both assume that mental states and the content they bear are central to the task of understanding others’
beliefs, intentions and so on. Since we are never in direct contact with the mental states of others, we must use
these sophisticated capacities to mindread at a distance, either by inferring the inner mental state of another
person through folk psychological rules and norms, or by taking on and simulating their mental states so as to
understand their behaviours (Spaulding 2018).
One enactive account, interactionist theory (IT), rejects these core assumptions and assumes instead
that most social cognition involves the direct perception of the minds of others - no mindreading required.
According to IT, social cognition does not fundamentally involve inference to others’ hidden internal mental
states and beliefs (Gallagher 2008). Rather, we employ strategies of inference infrequently, in more complicated
situations; this is the exception, not the rule. Social cognition is constituted in interaction with other agents,
where mental states and intentions are directly perceived as embodied processes. This kind of interactive sociality
can be broken down into two kinds: primary intersubjectivity, which involves a very basic and direct perceptual
understanding of another person (happy, restless, about to get up), and secondary intersubjectivity, wherein we
understand the intentionality of the other in relation to a shared context (looking at, gesturing towards, feeling
about) (Trevarthen and Hubley 1978).
One way of demonstrating di erences in commitments, empirical design and evaluation of the two
accounts is by comparing their interpretations of the false-belief test, a staple of social cognition research that
aims to demonstrate the development of theory of mind capacities in young children. A standard version of the
task involves dolls acting out a story. The doll in the story puts their toy down in a location and then leaves the
room. While the  rst doll is out of the room, a second doll moves the toy to another location. The  rst doll
returns, and the child watching the story is asked where they think that  rst doll will look for their toy (Onishi
and Baillargeon 2005). The results show that children under four years old typically respond by saying the
character should look for their toy in the new location it was moved to, suggesting that they’re unable to
understand that the character couldn’t possibly know the toy had moved. At age four and up, children correctly
indicate that the character will hold a false belief about the location of the toy, thinking it is still where they left
it. The younger children, it is held, are unable to distinguish their own beliefs from the beliefs other agents
would possess. The ability of more developed four year olds to successfully predict that the character will hold a
false-belief is taken to demonstrate a capacity to attribute beliefs to other agents, especially beliefs that di er
from their own.
Mindreading theorists account for this result with the explanation that younger children are missing a
discrete mindreading capacity. Around age 4, children gain (through some combination of sociocultural and
biologically driven development, the exact mix depending on whether you ask TT or ST theorists, and which
theorists in particular) the capacity to infer the contents of another’s mind. Hence social cognition is explained
as an inferential and interpretive capacity, an interpretation that has been well-supported by numerous empirical
studies (Spaulding 2018). The empirical  ndings that are taken to support mindreading accounts of false-belief
tests have been shown by meta-analysis to be highly reliable and consistent with one another (Wellman et al
2001). Further, in the case of ST, research into neural mechanisms of simulation (such as mirror neurons) has
been argued to bolster the physical plausibility of the account, and integrate the psychology-level phenomenon
with the neuroscienti c facts (Goldman 2006).
However if we assume, as IT does, that primary and secondary intersubjectivity establish the core of
what happens in social cognition, then it is not surprising that children fail at the more advanced kind of social
cognition required by the test. The capacity to express to another person the emotions and intentions that are
directly perceived involves the development of sociocultural skills of expression. Young children perform poorly
on the false-belief test compared to older children and adults not because they lack social cognitive abilities, but
because the experimental design is not actually eliciting a demonstration of ordinary social cognition (Gallagher
2008). The older children succeed at the task because they have had more time to be properly encultured with
the social and linguistic norms of giving reasons for the actions of others, not because they possess a
mindreading ability that they didn’t before (Gallagher and Hutto 2008).
2.2 Comparing the explanations
So, how has this interactionist alternative been received over in the mindreading camp? If the enactive
account is explanatorily superior, we might expect that advocates of TT and ST would question their adherence
to the cognitivist paradigm. On the contrary, prominent defenders like Spaulding and Carruthers are
unimpressed with IT, which in their view has very little meat on its bones when it comes to properly explaining
social cognition. Spaulding (2015, 2018) argues that the notions of primary and secondary intersubjectivity as
basic to social cognition rely too heavily on phenomenological evidence, which by her lights is insu cient since
under cognitivism, social cognition can be performed sub-personally and so be inaccessible to the agent on a
conscious level.
Carruthers (2016) also dismisses the interactionist story. In the face of alternative interactionist
explanations, Carruthers simply says: “...these approaches have not proven empirically fruitful: no new
discoveries have resulted. And in every case where a determinate proposal of this sort has been tested and
controlled for, it has been refuted” (Carruthers 2016 pg. 142). No new empirical data has been gleaned from
interactionism, and so, for Carruthers, “no new discoveries have resulted” (ibid). Cognition is something that
goes on in the head, and behaviour is the consequence of that head-based activity. A description of social
cognition that does not build towards an explanation of how social cognition is done in the head is not
addressing the appropriate explanantia, and so in Carruthers’ view the enactive story does not just present a bad
explanation, it does not provide any explanation of social cognition at all.
So, as Di Paolo et al (2018) observe regarding the mindreading mainstream: “the epistemic frame
remains untouched by experimental observations that could otherwise be used to examine it. The question ‘If
participants do not make inferences, what else could be going on?’ is not given a proper shot.” (pg. 16) But is
Carruthers wrong to operate from within such an exclusive framework? We don’t see any immediate reason to
think so. Both cognitivists and enactivists have their own distinct ideas about what social cognition is and
consequently what features of the world should be the target of an explanation thereof. Clearly those ideas are
quite di erent. Based on the discussion so far, there would be little reason to adjudicate that one side deserves,
just on the strength of its interpretation, to sweep the  eld and knock over the opposition.
However, Hutto and Myin (2013) have proposed a criterion for demonstrating the superiority of one
idea over the other: the best explanation is one that o ers empirical adequacy, which we take to imply that the
explanation o ers more than, and in doing so demonstrates the inadequacy of, the competing theory. In trying
to conceive such a means of explanation-comparison, a challenge arises that is simple to understand but
extremely di cult to solve. The two sides here have basically outlined the problem already: what counts as the
best explanation fundamentally depends on the assumptions you already have about what cognition is. To stick
with our example, enactivists believe that basic social cognition is non-representational, while mindreading
accounts are committed to representationalism. For the latter camp, cognition is a mostly brain-bound, internal
event, not something constituted in tandem with behaviour. Meanwhile, enactivists consider the environment
and entire organism (not just the brain) to be fundamentally constitutive of cognition, not merely causal inputs
and outputs for the brain. Empirical adequacy, and hence the better explanation, is very much in the eye of the
beholder. There is no room for arbitration here: Carruthers thinks minds are representation-manipulating
devices which make inferences at a distance about other such devices and so these items must appear in an
explanation, non-negotiably, because those are the required explanantia according to the cognitivist framework.
Hutto and Myin likewise argue that their assumptions are the correct ones. So whose assumptions are
correct? An immediate hurdle here concerns the nature of background assumptions in science: the raw data of
cognitive science systematically underdetermines which hypothesis we should accept about cognition, and what
 lls this gap between data and theory are the assumptions research communities are committed to. This has been
discussed at length in the philosophy of science literature:
“...how one determines evidential relevance, why one takes some state of a airs as evidence for one
hypothesis rather than for another, depends on one's other beliefs, which we can call background beliefs
or assumptions. Thus, a given state of a airs can be taken as evidence for the same hypothesis in light of
di ering background beliefs, and it can be taken as evidence for quite di erent and even con icting
hypotheses given appropriately con icting background beliefs. Similarly, di erent aspects of one state
of a airs can be taken as evidence for the same hypothesis in light of di ering background beliefs, and
they can serve as evidence for di erent and even con icting hypotheses ·given appropriately con icting
background beliefs.” (Longino 1990 pg. 43)
Hence the good sense in Gallagher’s (2017) claim that we shouldn’t expect “that there could be one single
critical experiment that might decide the issue between the representationalist and the enactivist” (pg. 21).
Carruthers and Spaulding are in the right in saying that enactivist assumptions don’t force a shift in a
cognitivist’s opinion on the best explanation for cognition. Researchers both scienti c and philosophical
typically view the targets of their  eld through a set of interconnected background beliefs established during
their training into a particular research paradigm, through the lens of which they judge data, hypotheses, and
theories. For instance, when outlining Gallagher’s (2004) account of primary intersubjectivity, Spaulding
attempts to clarify Gallagher’s claim that mental states are directly perceived through bodily activity by stating
that “[p]rimary intersubjectivity is more like bodyreading than mindreading” (Spaulding 2010 p. 122). But this
is precisely what Gallagher is trying not to say here; Gallagher is making the point that the mind is present in
bodily activity, so describing this as bodyreading misses the point. Almost re exively it seems, Spaulding forces
primary intersubjectivity into the inferential mould.2
Similarly enactivists will never concede to Carruthers’ explanation, because they do not think
representations are involved in basic social cognition, and so reject inferences by mental mechanisms as the
appropriate explanation for social cognition. The two opponents simply have no way to neutrally evaluate their
respective explanations from some perspective outside of these commitments. And, neither side has a way to
defeat the background beliefs of the other. Both theories are empirically adequate for those who hold the
assumptions of their paradigm.
For cognitivists, cognition can be fully explained in the established fashion. They have set out their idea
of what cognition is, where it is, and what an explanation of it should look like. There is coherence between
these ideas; based on what cognitivism proposes cognition is, their explanatory strategy and goals make sense.
Put another way, the explanatory gap isn’t a problem for cognitivism, since in the main cognitivists don’t see
subjectivity as explanatorily relevant to how cognition works. It simply isn’t a problem that must be solved in
their view. And, similarly, the cognitivist must concede that if cognition is indeed a process spanning brain, body
and environment that is deeply intertwined with questions of agency and subjectivity, then the enactive
explanatory strategy is coherent with that position. A full explanation on this enactive view could neither begin
nor end with physical and mental states happening in the brain.
2.3. Conclusion
In these sections we have addressed the hard sell of enactivism: the claim that enactivism unveils an
irresolvable explanatory gap within cognitivism, and as such generates a crisis in cognitivism that will lead to a
paradigm shift. We showed that this is not the case either in theory or in practice. First, there is no reason to
think there is a gap within cognitivism that will bring about a paradigm shift, nor that enactivism is the
harbinger of such a collapse. Second, the alternative view that enactivism provides better explanations than
cognitivism, and therefore ought to replace it, does not bear out either. The social cognition literature provides a
perfect example of how explanations are taken to be better based on previously existing commitments, as well as
the resilience and adaptability of the cognitivist paradigm to integrate insights from enactivism (though in their
own terms). Enactive interpretations of a given phenomenon aren’t exactly up to the task if the goal is to displace
or defeat the cognitivist interpretation, and vice versa. With the hard sell unlikely to shift any paradigms, this
leaves us with the soft sell.
3. The Soft Sell
2 Demonstrating the obverse process, Schönherr and Westra (2017) show in detail how an interactionist story -
which elevates the interaction itself to an ontologically and epistemically distinct feature of cognition - can be
interpreted into a coherent cognitivist story.
The soft sell of enactivism promotes the attractiveness of an enactive framework in contrast with
mainstream cognitivism. Faced with an entrenched cognitivist paradigm that permeates from cognitive science
right down to popular folk understanding of the mind, the soft sell presents the allure of enactivism to
potentially interested philosophers and scientists. In this section we elaborate on this soft sell of the enactive
paradigm: that if researchers would just entertain some enactivist assumptions, they will then see the value in
enactive explanations. Given the background assumptions that go into theory choice, we detail some of these
commitments that might lead one to  nd enactivism more enticing than cognitivism.
One such appeal suggests that enactive explanations should be more attractive than their cognitivist
alternatives because they are more conceptually elegant (Hutto and Myin 2017). Conceptual elegance here
appears to mean an account free from the unnecessary conceptual bloat that talk of internal representational and
symbol-manipulating reasoning processes introduces into explanations of cognition. Cognitive phenomena are
more elegantly explained when an account can be given without assuming the need for these kinds of entities,
and enactivism provides the resources for doing precisely this. For example, Hutto (2019) shifts to the soft sell in
describing his strategy for removing unneeded entities from an account of mathematical reasoning in order to
build an enactive alternative: “[s]ubtract any residual commitment to mental representation,
information-processing stories, and neuro-fetishism...Subtract any residual constructivism, anti-realism, and
idealistic elements from the account. Finally, subtract any lingering psychologism about mathematics and its
content” (Hutto 2019, p. 835).
Taking issue with various -isms is also a running theme: what Hutto calls neuro-fetishism, residual
constructivism, psychologism. While we can trace Hutto’s problems with these ideas back to the common
denominator of the hard sell--they are all representationalist accounts that are meant to be explanatorily worse
than the enactive alternative--the criticism seems to go beyond that concern. Describing the outward signs of
representationalist commitments as a kind of fetishism is certainly evocative and seems to voice a certain distaste;
likewise psychologism stirs up ideas of a dogmatic scientism. Similarly, the accusation of intellectualism (Hutto
and Myin 2013) is presented as a distinct criticism involving a concern over an unattractive mode of thinking
that languishes in early modern and Platonic notions of humans as chie y thinkers, rather than doers. While this
could all be read as merely a colourful extension of the hard sell, we see a distinct soft sell here: Hutto’s
characterization of the unnecessary and problematic clutter of cognitivism appeals to the more parsimonious or
ontologically minimalist qualities of enactivism, and those who stick to that cognitivist clutter are
wrong-headed.
Taken by itself, though, this does not provide a particularly forceful case for the paradigm-shifting
nature of enactivism. That enactivist explanations are not cluttered with mental entities such as states and
representations may be alluring to those with a preference for desert landscapes, but preferences alone cannot
upset a dominant paradigm. Tastes may factor into the choice of best alternative theory during a Kuhnian crisis,
but paradigms do not rise and fall due to arbitration over who is the greater aesthete.
Another soft sell strategy we see employed by enactivists is to marshal their e orts toward the prima
facie, immediately observable features of nature. In their view, these provide powerful evidence that cognition is
constituted by the organism and environment through their conjoined dynamical interactions, and not through
internal computations. It is only the inattention, deliberate or innocent, of the cognitivist mainstream to these
features of the world that hides the facts which corroborate with the enactive picture. When properly re ected
upon, computational explanations “to many people, do not match well the situated and richly
context-dependent experiences and activities they enact every day” (Di Paolo et al 2017 pg. 12).
Hutto and Myin propose that part of remedying this inattention is to take a clear-eyed look at
cognition, unencumbered by assumptions about the kinds of representational and computational activity that
cognition is typically thought to require, at the relationality that we experience  rst-hand out in the world: “In
rejecting [cognitivism] in this domain, REC takes at face value what attending to the architectonic details of
how these agents work suggests: that the speci ed bodily and environmental factors are equal partners in
constituting the embodied, enactive intelligence and cognition of these arti cial and natural agents” (2013, p.
44). A clear-eyed look at cognition, taking the world “at face value” as they put it, will reveal that these details of
the organism-environment coupling are vital parts of the explanatory story for cognition. Neglecting them
means neglecting the very foundations of cognition.
A similar line is taken by Di Paolo et al (2017): “The assumptions that validate speci c lines of
investigation in this mode are not universal though they are treated as if they were, particularly the assumption
that the mind works like a special kind of computer. A careful look at what we know about our bodies, about
their biology, and the way they organize themselves into powers and sensitivities, a look at the way we experience
the world as situated creatures in complex relations to other creatures tells a rather di erent story” (Di Paolo et al
2017 pg. 2). This lack of neutral observation has “biased cognitive explanations toward the disembodied and
intellectualist end of the spectrum, the kind of explanations that, to many people, do not match well the situated
and richly context-dependent experiences and activities they enact every day” (Di Paolo et al 2017 pg. 12). On
this view, if we take a more careful look at living cognitive organisms we will see that they give us no obvious
signs of operating, at least at the level of basic cognition, as representation-hungry symbol-manipulators.
We do not here take issue with the enactive interpretation of the kinds of “face value” facts about
cognition that enactivism tries to capture. After all, any novel scienti c theorising is going to have to originate
with people seeing something new in observations of nature. But is it actually obvious to a clear-eyed observer
that computationalism misses features of life and mind that are plain to see for the unencumbered? We take it as
fairly given in contemporary philosophy of science and epistemology that human beings are always embedded in
some context that  avours their interpretation of events, scientists included. Scientists are embedded in
historically situated communities that o er and constrain possible interpretations of phenomena (Kuhn
1962/2012). Our appraisals of incoming observations of nature are necessarily made in the context of a web of
belief, and in this holistic way our background beliefs and assumptions both allow us to make sense of events
and accommodate them into our existing understanding of the world (Quine 1951).
With this in mind, it is hard to see how a cognitivist appraisal of some cognitive phenomenon is less
clear-eyed or less neutral than the appraisal made by an enactivist. It also seems hard to claim that an enactivist is
uncommitted or pure of mind. Enactivism is, if anything, a novel lens through which to interpret the
phenomena of cognition, not the absence of a lens.
In this section we have argued that the soft sell of enactivism, like the hard sell, does not herald a coming
paradigm shift. Arguments that enactivism is simply evident to a careful, neutral, or unencumbered observer
don’t quite hit the mark, and appeals to aesthetic or other pre-existing partialities do not o er a rigorous way of
demonstrating that the enactive account of cognition is explanatorily superior to the cognitivist account.
Cognitivism is only de cient if one abandons the background assumptions that motivate cognitivism, and one is
not given a good reason to abandon those assumptions by the successes of enactivism. This may be a bitter pill to
swallow for some--but the alternatives are either to embark on a quest to solve the problem of
underdetermination, or show that there is an alternative way to argue that enactivism is preferable to
cognitivism. To those who choose the former, we wish them well; as for the latter, this will be our focus in the
remainder of the paper.
4. From Paradigm to Philosophy of Nature
A paradigm shift is o  the table. No internal strife is collapsing the cognitivist consensus, and the
adequacy of enactivism is relative to the di ering background assumptions that motivate it, which do not bode
anything for cognitivism. But a shift in paradigms need not be the endgame for enactivism anyway.
Championing a paradigm shift sells short the enactive project by limiting its scope to a single research program.
Instead, what enactivism o ers is something more integrative, more broad, and more fundamental: a philosophy
of nature.
The notion of a philosophy of nature used here originates with Godfrey-Smith’s (2001) discussion of
developmental systems theory (DST). DST, for context, is a “general theoretical perspective” on many of the big
issues in biology, such as “development, heredity and evolution” (Oyama et al 2001 pg. 2). It places a strong
emphasis on holism in explaining and understanding biological phenomena, and sets itself up in opposition to
the more genetically-deterministic mainstream within biology. While DST has had a strong appeal for many
theorists, its exact nature, and its exact aims, remained unclear to non-enthusiasts, as expressed by
Godfrey-Smith: “What kind of theory is DST? Is it a scienti c theory or a philosophical theory? Is it an
empirical hypothesis, a suggested program of research, a philosophical gloss on our existing knowledge, or what?
What di erence does it make whether or not the central ideas associated with DST are true?” (Godfrey-Smith
2001 p. 283).
In light of this confusion about what DST provides, Godfrey-Smith proposes a distinction between a
scientific research program and a philosophy of nature, saying that what DST o ers is a mixture of the two. A
research program must o er guidance for empirical work, though this can vary in speci cs between programs.
He points out that DST includes a set of foundational empirical claims, foundational conceptual language, and
explanatory standards (2001). These are consistent with what we would  nd in a research paradigm, as described
above. A philosophy of nature, on the other hand, “can use its own categories and concepts, concepts developed
for the task of describing the world as accurately as possible when a range of scienti c descriptions are to be
taken into account, and when a philosophical concern with the underlying structure of theories is appropriate”
(Godfrey-Smith 2001 p. 284). A philosophy of nature is said to come “after” science in the sense that it
redescribes the work of one or more research programs in an e ort to integrate their  ndings into the most
accurate picture of the world.
The idea that enactivism might likewise be thought of as a philosophy of nature was  rst proposed in
print by Shaun Gallagher (2017). Gallagher presents the option of treating enactivism as a philosophy of nature3
as a solution to the problem of holism, to the e ect that the more holistic the perspective on cognition, the more
appropriate it is to treat that approach like a philosophy of nature. This is meant to be the case because “it is
di cult to operationalize holism. Neither experimental control nor the division of labor in science allows for all
factors to be taken into consideration at once” (2017, p. 21). However, this doesn’t mean that enactivist
concerns are merely “explanatorily idle debates” (Miłkowski et al. 2018 p. 11). The stakes of a philosophy of
nature are perhaps higher than those of any speci c research program, a point made salient through Gallagher’s
“clunky robot” problem:
3 Gallagher credits this insight to Cecilia Heyes.
“[J]just as one can design a robot by assigning teams to construct di erent modules, which turn out to
work well as individual modules, it may happen that when the modules are brought together, they
don’t play well together. No one has considered the relational aspects of how one module will
dynamically connect with another in a complex system, and the result is a clunky machine-like
behavior. The same problem can be found in theory construction. Scienti c experiments, designed
within the framework of their own particular paradigm, often study the pieces of a system but don’t
always consider how the dynamical relations among those pieces work, and don’t always have the
vocabulary to address those relations.” (2017, p. 22)
Gallagher’s analogy makes clear that the stakes of theory building do not merely concern the ability of a research
program to form and solve problems and generate data. Integration between research programs, especially in an
interdisciplinary research area such as cognitive science, is a necessary consideration for making progress.
In this way, a philosophy of nature ought not to be thought of as only coming after science, but also as
theoretically underpinning scienti c progress. Where a paradigm is a focused scienti c research programme in
which a narrow set of shared beliefs are a boon for facilitating phenomenon-speci c methodologies, tools, and
language for data interpretation and synthesis, a philosophy of nature consists of describing (or re-describing)
these in terms of overarching beliefs that line up with a speci c ontological picture of the world. In this way, a
philosophy of nature might be thought of more as a worldview. That is, its commitments are not
paradigm-speci c, but structural: they provide the basis on which we can build the narrow sets of shared beliefs
that support a research program, and further, they underpin and support the integration of research programs.4
This supports the kinds of possible outcomes that Godfrey-Smith has proposed: “This philosophical
work might well come to have an e ect on the science itself; it might change the hidden or overt philosophical
commitments of the scientists. But the absence of such an e ect on science does not rob the philosophical work
of its value” (Godfrey-Smith 2001, p. 285). A philosophy of nature does not necessarily need to in uence
science, and certainly there are plenty of philosophies of nature that make no e ort to do so. However, a
philosophy of nature is oftentimes an impetus for scienti c advancement, as it provides the theoretical
grounding on which a research paradigm can be built. We have discussed in the previous section the need for
taking background beliefs into account in thinking about how it is that there can be alternative paradigms which
are both capable of producing problems and solutions. Philosophies of nature form the grounding for the
alternative theories proposed during a scienti c revolution, when a dominant paradigm has a crisis due to
internal  aws and inconsistencies. Were there no philosophies of nature, there would be nothing on which to
develop these new paradigms. Thus, we agree with Gallagher that “even if enactivism were to be considered a
philosophy of nature, it wouldn’t be right to conclude that it cannot o er concrete hypotheses or raise novel
scienti c questions” (Gallagher 2017, p. 24). The issue is not whether enactivism might be capable of doing so,
but the di culties therein.
Of course, enactivism is not a monolithic or uni ed philosophy of nature. There are varying and even
hybrid versions of enactivism (Ward et al 2017). However, all varieties reject the ontological reality of the
4 Manuel Heras Escribano (2021) has argued that ecological psychology o ers both a philosophy of nature and a
well-developed research program, and thus is at an advantage to enactivism. We do not here o er a comparison
of enactivism and ecological psychology--and we do not necessarily disagree. However, we note that Heras
Escribano’s contention is with the idea that a philosophy of nature redescribes data produced by other research
programs (Godfrey-Smith 2001, Gallagher 2017). We argue here that a philosophy of nature does more than
that.
computational approach to cognition, as well as the focus on the brain and central nervous systems as the sole
locus of cognition: “[i]nstead of understanding cognition as a computer-like process, enactivism starts by
considering it as a lifelike process anchored in the living body” (Di Paolo et al 2017 pg. 20, emphases original).
However, not all cognitive scientists are committed to the ontological reality of cognition as computation.
Computational terminology retains its practical and heuristic value so long as it is explanatorily useful within its
research program. What Gallagher points out is that as a philosophy of nature, enactivism is after much more
than a replacement of terminology in cognitive science; enactivism’s ontological commitments demand an
understanding of the explanatorily relevant phenomena of cognition - being irreducible, processual, embodied,
and relational - that is incompatible with the cognitivist research program. On his view, progress in cognitive
science is being held up by its ongoing commitments to the computational metaphor:
“Being a pragmatist about the vocabulary of representation...or about the vocabulary of inference, is at
best only a temporary stance toward a set of placeholders that need ultimately to be cashed out not just
in a di erent conception of brain function, but in a di erent philosophy of nature. An alternative way
of thinking about nature should push hard on cognitive scienti c practice in a way that makes doing
science more di cult, but also more productive.” (Gallagher 2017, p. 126)
What enactivism does do is present a set of background beliefs that make traditional operationalizations of
cognition problematic. There’s nothing to suggest enactivist operationalisations are inherently trickier to
execute. They simply  y in the face of conventional dogma about what minds are, where they begin and end,
how they can be broken down into examinable components, and the like. But this is only one aspect, or
consequence, or having a di erent worldview. We have discussed the nature of background beliefs and
assumptions, and how these weave an interconnected web of ideas that encourage and constrain our
hypothesising. They allow us to bundle together data into intelligible hypotheses, to determine our epistemic
standards, and speak as a research community about the kinds of accounts of phenomena we  nd satisfactory or
lacking. In a discipline that requires a great deal of conceptual work, the guiding conceptual compass for
research is the web of beliefs and assumptions that make up a philosophy of nature--and a compass is used to tell
us where we ought to be heading, not where we are.
Other enactivists appear to concur with this assessment. Representations are “an awkward place-holder
for an explanation that still needs to be given in dynamical terms of an embodied, environmentally embedded,
and enactive model” (Gallagher 2017 pg. 106), and cognitivist attempts to explain seamless, pragmatic bodily
interactions with the world in representational terms “always miss something that cannot be expressed as the
summation of several rules, objective standards and precise norms” (Di Paolo et al 2017 pg. 12). Hutto and
Myin (2013) take to task even those enactivists who they see as “slipping into unguarded talk of perceivers’ (or
their brains’) making assumptions, predictions, and judgements in ways that look decidedly as if the view is
committed to the existence of propositional rather than essentially practical knowledge” (pg. 26). The stakes are
not limited to the best way to generate data for understanding speci c problems about cognition. Enactivist
concerns range far beyond the boundaries of a paradigm.
5. Conclusion
We have identi ed that enactivism contains two very distinct projects: a critique of cognitivism, and the
building of its own alternative. Though enactive work so far has (as we have shown in this paper) assumed their
mutual entanglement, in fact the latter is not substantially assisted by the former, and in any case the task of
dismantling cognitivism has for all practical purposes been unsuccessful. Whether or not cognitivism will
eventually be replaced remains to be seen, but if that time comes, enactivists need to have done more than act as
harbingers of the revolution: actually existing enactivism has to be a viable alternative. If enactivism is as Wheeler
(2015) says akin to a revolutionary manifesto, then let us stick with the metaphor for a moment and consider
that the step between manifesto and successful revolution is praxis.
Our strategy in this paper has been to clear out the paradigm talk that has cluttered the eyeline of
enactivist work, and setting aside the drive to defeat cognitivism that has obscured the real horizons of the
enactive project. Neither the hard nor soft sells of enactivism have been a success. It would seem that enactive
philosophy is not steering mainstream cognitive science in a new direction. Science will continue its work so long
as the dominant paradigm keeps enabling research. Enactivist work skewed towards rooting out cognitivist
corruption, and contrasting the philosophical virtues of their own framework with the  aws of cognitivism,
threatens cognitivism with no more than a heuristic reminder to pay attention to the interactive aspects of
cognition (Milkowski et al 2018).
This raises a question: what if, as enactivists argue, cognitivism eventually stalls as a research program -
what has enactivism o ered in terms of grounding for an alternative? Keijzer (2001) has warned that “[w]ithout
a good replacement, even a feeble story will remain the best explanation available (Stich, 1983). Without a
‘Copernican alternative’ we will not have a ‘Copernican turn’” p. 44-45). Thus far, enactivism does not have a
comprehensive story for how the various capacities of the mind can be explained, and how these can be
examined empirically. Part of the problem here is undoubtedly due to the shaky conceptual ground of
enactivism: there still is no overarching framework, nor do we see the kind of scienti c “divide and conquer”
schemes for operationalisation taken up in cognitivist cognitive science (we think here of (Marr 1982)’s (1982)
framework for perception research, Gibson’s (1979) ecological approach, and Craver’s (2007) mechanism as this
kind of work). These are frameworks that allow for the operationalisation of theory, and with the explicit goal of
establishing explanatory goals and norms for a  eld.
Nevertheless there are enactivists working to expand the capacities of enactivism. In some corners of
science and philosophy, the  elds are being tilled and the careful work of building an enactive account is being
carried out. For philosophers, the steady grassroots of this work consists in building the most accurate picture of
nature that enactivism can provide, furnishing the concepts that will allow us to understand this new image of
nature, and which ultimately will work to integrate the questions and  ndings of diverse  elds of scienti c study
that are the subject matter of enactivism.
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